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Perspective

Synopsis of the Report of the Second
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and
Ethnic Fairness in the Courts
Jay C. Carlisle*
The recent Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts ("Taskforce")' observes "some biased conduct toward parties and witnesses
based on gender or race or ethnicity has occurred on the part of
both judges and lawyers." "Biased conduct toward lawyers
based on gender or race or ethnicity, has occurred to a greater
degree. ' 2 The Report concludes that such conduct is unacceptable and admonishes all participants in the Second Circuit
3
courts to guard against it.
The purpose of this Perspective is to
review several sections of the Report. 4 The Perspective is written from an informative, not an analytical, standpoint and is
intended to summarize the status of key issues raised by the
Task Force.
* Jay C. Carlisle is a Professor of Law at the Pace University School of Law.
He was a member of the Gender Subcommittee on the Court as Employer for the
Working Committee to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness.
1. See Preliminary Draft Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender,
Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, June 7, 1997 [hereinafter "Task Force
Report" (on file in the Pace University School of Law, Law Review Office).
2. Id. at 42.
3. Id. at 43.
4. See id. at Chapter Four entitled The Baruch Report: Survey Results of Observations and Opinions of Judges, Lawyers, Law Clerks, and Courtroom Deputies
and Chapter Nine, entitled Complaints.
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Introduction

5
In the fall of 1993 the Second Circuit Judicial Council
voted unanimously to create a Task Force on Gender, Racial
and Ethnic Fairness composed of seven Judicial officers and
three attorneys. 6 The Judicial Council's action was prompted
by a 1992 resolution by the Judicial conference of the United
States which warned that bias, in all of its forms, presented a
danger to the effective administration of justice in federal
courts. 7 Similarly, in early 1994 Congress passed the Violence
Against Women Act and specifically asked federal courts to
study "the nature and extend of gender bias."8
The Task Force recognized the difficulties of asking Second
Circuit judges to evaluate themselves and asked members of
the bar and legal academics to complete an independent investigation and to submit their report to the Task Force. 9 By July of
1994 approximately sixty volunteers from throughout the Second Circuit had been selected and spent 1995 and 1996 studying specific areas. The Second Circuit Task Force on Gender,
Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, was submitted on
5. At the time of the vote, the Judicial Council for the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit consisted of Chief Circuit Judge Newman; Circuit Judges
Kearse, Cardamone, Winter, Miner, Altimari, and Mahoney; Schif District Judges
Griesa, McAvoy, Platt, Cabranes, Telesca, and Parker.
6. The members of the Task Force were the Honorable Sharon E. Grubin (CoChair), the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr. (Co-Chair), the Honorable John T. Curtin, the Honorable Sterling Johnson, Jr., the Honorable Constance Baker Motley,
the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, the Honorable Lawrence W. Pierce, Ellen Mercer
Fallon, Esq., Fern Schair, Esq. and Sue Ann Shay, S.D.N., Esq. Judge Pierce
retired prior to issuance of the Report and is not listed as a member of the Task
Force.
7. See Task Force Report, supra, at note 1, at 1.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 14001.
9. The volunteer group is referred to as the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts.
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Esq. was named as the Executive Director. John H. Doyle,
Esq. and Bettina B. Plevan, Esq. were named as co-chairs of the Gender Committee. Professor Diane L. Zimmerman of the New York University School of Law was
named as Reporter for the Gender Committee. William J. Snipes, Esq. and Hector
Willems Rodriguez, Esq. were named as co-chairs of the Racial and Ethnic Committee. Professor Beryl Jones of Brooklyn Law School was named as Report to the
Racial and Ethnic Committee. Special Assistants for both committees were Ms.
Sharon Arnoldi, Ms. Paula Gerard and Ms. Amy D. Hundert. Professor Carroll
Seron of Baruch College of the City University of New York served as the committees' Social Science Advisor.
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June 5, 1997, and is referred to as Exhibit "A" of the Task Force
Report. Also, a survey was undertaken by experts from Baruch
College of the City University of New York ("the Baruch Report")10 and written questionnaires were sent to all judicial officers, law clerks, courtroom deputy clerks, and all other court
employees in the circuit. Finally a telephone survey of lawyers,
with a written follow-up to non-respondents, was conducted by
Louis Harris and Associates and this data was then presented
to focus groups around the circuit." The Baruch Report was
submitted in June of 1997 and is referred to as Exhibit "B" of
the Task Force Report. Exhibit "C" to the Report was prepared
by the Employment Economics Division of Price Waterhouse
LLP on November 21, 1996 and is entitled "Statistical Analysis
for the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic
2
Fairness in the Courts."
The Task Force's Report was released, with Exhibits "A,,
"B" and "C," to the public during the summer of 1998. This essay will highlight sections four and nine of the Task Force Report with particular reference to the Baruch Report.
II.

Section IV of the Task Force Report

The objective of the Task Force study was "to examine
whether, how, and when gender, race, or ethnicity affect the
quality or nature of individual experience in the circuit's federal
courts, both as to those who are involved in the litigation process and those who are court employees." 13 Earlier studies by
the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force 4 and the Task Force
10. This report, entitled "A Report of the Perceptions and Experiences of Lawyers, Judges and Court Employees Concerning Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness
In the Federal Courts of the Second Circuit of the United States" [hereinafter "The
Baruch Report"] was completed in June of 1997 and is on file in the offices of the
Pace University School of Law, Law Review.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 5.
14. See The Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force
(1992). The Ninth Circuit study demonstrated a "complex" picture about the ways
in which gender affects professional interactions between judges and attorneys.
The authors of that report argued that gender adds an extra dimension that is
often discomforting and sometimes destructive to female counsel. They summarized their findings as follows: "Taken together, these data suggest that women
and men in the Ninth Circuit perceive the same world differently or inhabit differ-
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on Racial and Ethnic Bias and Task Force on Gender Bias in
the Courts for the District of Columbia had reported systematic
and persistent differences in the perceptions of men and women
and white and minority judges. 1 5 A New York State Task Force
on Women in the Courts found "gender bias against women litigants, attorneys and court employees is a pervasive problem
with grave consequences."1 6 Thus, the Second Circuit Task
Force commissioned an elaborate survey by the School of Public
Affairs at Baruch College. The primary investigative technique
of the Baruch Report was the distribution of detailed questionnaires to judges, lawyers and those court employees in a position to observe courtroom conduct.
The response rate for these groups were as follows: (1) Seventh three percent of the judges responded. (2) Seventy three
percent of courtroom deputy and law clerks responded. (3) Seventy percent of assistant United States attorneys and public defenders responded and (4) a significant number of attorneys
who had filed appearances or participated in Second Circuit
17
courts in 1995 responded.
A.

Overview of the Findings

White male judges and white male attorneys consistently
responded that gender and race/ethnicity do not matter.'8 They
"tend to believe that the federal courts of the Second Circuit are
color and gender blind toward those who practice in it."' 9 However, some female judges and most female attorneys reported
observing a court where gender frequently compromised the
fairness of proceedings in the Second Circuit. 20 The findings
ent worlds, one characterized by feelings of exclusion and the other by feelings of
acceptance." The Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force
(1992:6).
15. See Final Report of the Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Bias and Task
Force on Gender Bias in the Courts (District of Columbia, 1992).
16. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORD.
Urban L. J. 1 (1986-87) (This 198 page report contains 463 footnotes and is the
most comprehensive report on gender bias produced anywhere.) See Annual Report of The New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts (November 1997) (copy on file with the Pace Law Review).
17. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 25-26.
18. See The Baruch Report, supra note 10 at 25-26.
19. Id. at 26.
20. See id. at 25.
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with regard to both female and minority attorneys were as
follows:
white and minority female attorneys and minority male attorneys
report that members of their own group are more disadvantaged
than other groups. White female attorneys, for instance, observe
that they are more disadvantaged than minority male and minority female attorneys in private practice. Similarly, minority male
and minority female attorneys report that they are more disad21
vantaged than white female attorneys.
These responses and other statistical data convinced the Task
Force that "Notwithstanding some risk of survey error, we are
satisfied that the Baruch Report provides a reliable basis for
drawing the conclusions we have reached." 22 These conclusions
are as follows:
1. Biased Conduct Directed at Partiesand Witnesses
The biased treatment of parties and witnesses comprised
instances where a witness was (1) ignored, interrupted or not
listened to; (2) helped or coached in a patronizing way; (3) subjected to a sexually oriented remark; or (4) subjected to derogatory remarks related to gender, race, or ethnicity (including
parodying an accent). Overall few judges and court employees
reported biased conduct by lawyers based on gender or race or
ethnicity directed at parties or witnesses, but 26.9 percent of
female judges observed parties or witnesses ignored, interrupted, or not listened to by lawyers, which the judges attrib23
uted to racial or ethnic bias.
Few white male lawyers reported any bias against parties
and witnesses. Female and minority lawyers reported biased
conduct toward parties and witnesses by other lawyers to a
greater degree. The Task Force stresses:
Apart from the reported occurrences of biased conduct, the most
significant aspect of the data on treatment of parties and witnesses is the difference between the extent to which such conduct
is reported by white males as compared to females and minority
24
males, and by whites as compared to minorities.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 28-34.
The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 27.
See id. at 28-29.
Id. at 31.
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Biased Conduct Directed Against Lawyers

The Baruch Report presented data as to what lawyers reported they themselves have experienced and what judges,
court employees (law clerks and courtroom deputy clerks), and
other lawyers reported they have observed. 25 Few white male
attorneys reported experiencing bias. About one half of the female attorneys reported they had experienced conduct based on
26
race or ethnicity.
However, a substantial percentage of all attorneys observed
biased conduct based on gender and race. Fifty four percent of
white male attorneys, seventy seven percent of white female attorneys, seventy nine percent of minority male attorneys and
eighty percent of minority female attorneys reported observing
biased treatment of other attorneys based on gender. 27 Almost
fifty percent of white female attorneys and minority male lawyers reported observing a female attorney mistaken for a nonattorney.28 Over thirty percent of white female attorneys and
minority male and female attorneys reported observing attorneys helped or coached in a patronizing way, which they attributed to gender bias. 29 Less than eight percent of white
30
attorneys reported these types of gender bias.
Almost forty one percent of white male attorneys, fifty nine
percent of white female attorneys, seventy eight percent of minority male attorneys and eighty five percent of minority female
attorneys reported observing biased treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity. 3 1 Twelve percent of white male
attorneys, twenty one percent of white female attorneys, thirty
nine percent of minority male and female attorneys reported observing that attorneys had been subjected to derogatory racial
or ethnic remarks. 32 Thirteen percent of white male attorneys,
twenty two percent of white female attorneys, forty five percent
of minority male attorneys and eighteen percent of minority fe25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 32.
id. at 33.
The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 34, n. 25.
id. at 34, n. 25.
id.
id.
id. at 35, note 26.
The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 34, n. 25.
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male attorneys reported that they have observed an imitation
or parody of manner of speech of an attorney, which they attributed to racial or ethnic bias. 33 Finally, one percent of white
male attorneys, four percent of white female attorneys, forty
three percent of minority male attorneys and twenty eight percent of minority female attorneys reported that they had observed attorneys helped or coached in a patronizing way, which
34
they attributed to racial or ethnic bias.
The Task Force states that, "a significant percentage of
lawyers reported observing biased conduct based on gender,
race or ethnicity directed at other lawyers by judges and court
employees, as well as by lawyers."35 Ten percent of white male
attorneys, thirty six percent of white female attorneys, thirty
one percent of minority male attorneys and forty seven percent
of minority female attorneys reported observing biased treatment of other attorneys based on gender by judges. 36 At least
twenty percent of all attorneys, with the exception of white
male counsel, reported observing biased treatment of other attorneys based on gender by court employees. 37 Seven percent of
white male attorneys, thirteen percent of white female attorneys, forty percent of minority male attorneys and forty one percent of minority female attorneys reported observing biased
treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity by
judges. Similarly a significant number of all attorneys, with the
exception of white male counsel, reported observing biased
treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity by court
employees. 38 Finally, forty seven percent of white male attorneys, sixty six percent of white female attorneys, sixty one percent of minority male attorneys and seventy seven percent of
minority female attorneys reported observing biased treatment
of attorneys based on gender by other attorneys. 39 Twenty
seven percent of white male attorneys, forty eight percent of
white female attorneys, fifty four percent of minority male attorneys and sixty percent of minority female attorneys reported
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
Id.
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 35, n. 28-30.
id.
The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 36.
id. at 36.
id.
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observing biased treatment of attorneys based on race or ethnic40
ity by other attorneys.
B.

Opinions and Beliefs About Biased Treatment of Attorneys
1.

The Judges Perspective

Most judges reported that all attorneys are treated very
fairly. However, the percentage reporting this view dropped
"somewhat" when the judges were asked to report whether female and minority attorneys were treated very fairly. 4 1 A significant number of female judges reported gender and racial
bias. 42 The Task Force noted that "few judges believe that lawyers are ever disadvantaged based on their race or sex in court
proceedings specifically, but the percentages expressing this
view increased somewhat when the judges were asked about female and minority lawyers. '43
2.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Second Circuit Task Force reached the following conclusions based on the data discussed in chapter four of their Report. First, some biased conduct toward parties and witnesses
based on gender or race or ethnicity has occurred on the part of
both judges and attorneys. Second, biased conduct toward attorneys based on gender or race or ethnicity, has occurred to a
greater degree. Third, it is significant that far more women
then men, particularly white men, report observing biased conduct based on gender, and that far more minorities than whites
report observing biased conduct based on race or ethnicity.
The Task Force recommended that copies of its report and
the appended reports, surveys and statistical data be distributed to all judges and court persona. The Task Force urged
them to become familiar with the Report and exhibits and to
take steps to minimize the type of bias reported.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 39.
Id.
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Chapter IX of the Task Force Report: Complaints
1. Against Judges

The Task Force points out that many respondents who
have experienced or observed biased treatment by judges, attorneys, and court employees in the Second Circuit have not registered a formal complaint with the courts. 44 The Task Force's
Report alerts the bar to the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 4 5which establishes a formal
complaint mechanism which can be used to report misconduct
by Article III, bankruptcy and magistrate judges. The Report
notes that a complainant can file a verified complaint with the
clerk of the Court of Appeals or can register a complaint with
the Chief Judge. 46 These complaints are subject to initial
screening and then forwarded to a special investigative committee composed of the Chief Judge along with Court of Appeals
and District judges appointed in equal numbers by the Chief
Judge. The Judicial Council can sanction the accused judge in a
number of ways short of removal from office. Petitions to appeal
from the Judicial Council's decision can be made to the United
47
States Judicial Conference.
The Task Force makes three recommendations to encourage reporting of incidents of race, ethnicity and gender bias
on the part of judges:
First, the courts should consider whether the initial screening
process, currently administered solely by the Chief Judge, might
be expanded to include review by a committee of lawyers. This
might enhance public confidence in the complaint process. Second, whoever performs the initial screening process should be
careful not to overlook genuine complaints of gender or race biased conduct which (because of inartful drafting by a complainant
not trained in the law) may appear to argue only the merits of the
complainant's case... Third, to encourage those who may be deterred from registering complaints of misconduct because they
44. See id. at 43.

45. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 106 ("Between 1991 and 1995,
371 misconduct complaints were filed against judicial officers, and only 22 raised
allegations of race or gender bias. All bias complaints, like all complaints generally, were dismissed as relating to the merits of the case, frivolous, or unsupported.
In fact, 98.6 percent of all complaints filed are dismissed." Id. at 106, n. 105.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
47. See The Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 107.
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fear reprisal, the courts should set out clearly the circuit's rules
on the alternative mechanism for triggering the complaint with
the chief judge who conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is sufficient independent evidence of misconduct to trigger the Section 372 proceedings."48
2. Against Lawyers
The Task Force Report points out that most courts in the
circuit have some procedure to register complaints regarding
misconduct of attorneys. Several courts have established grievance committees comprised of lawyers and judges to investigate
attorney misconduct claims. Also, referral to state disciplinary
committees is an option in every district. Nonetheless, the Task
Force Reports that, "even where they exist, the district court
grievance committees rarely receive reports of misconduct by
lawyers". The Task Force recommends that each court formalize and publicize its policy for registering and investigating
complaints of attorney misconduct.
3.

Against Court Employees

The Task Force states, "No court in this circuit has a formal
procedure to receive complaints about discriminatory conduct
by court employees." Instead court employees must seek informal assistance by writing to the clerk of the court in the district
or to the supervisor of the employee or agency for whom he or
she works. This procedure has resulted in very few complaints.
D.

Suggested Procedure

The Task Force recognizes that "any unwillingness of aggrieved persons to report biased conduct creates problems for a
court." The Task Force then recommends that the courts in the
Second Circuit establish a uniform, formal mechanism to consider complaints about court employees. Finally, the Task
Force recommends that each court in the circuit adopt a rule
noting the circuit's disapproval of any conduct which is gender
or racially biased. Also, the Task Force recommends that each
court in the circuit declare its intent to take corrective action
where appropriate. The Report recommends the following rule:
48. Id.
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It shall constitute misconduct for a lawyer to:
1.

2.

commit, during the representation of a client in the Second
Circuit, any verbal or physical discriminatory act, on account
of race, ethnicity, or gender if intended to improperly intimidate litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, opposing
counsel or other lawyers or to gain a tactical advantage; or
to engage, in the course of representing a client in a matter in
the Second Circuit, in any continuing course of verbal or physical discriminatory conduct, on account of race, ethnicity, or
gender, in dealings with litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, opposing counsel or other lawyers, if such conduct constitutes harassment.
III.

Conclusion

The Task Force recognizes that "Bias can be conscious or,
in the more likely case, unconscious." The Task Force states,
The foregoing definition is followed by a pertinent quote from the
English educator Sir Walter Moberly: "the most pernicious kind
of bias consists in falsely supposing yourself to have none". This
observation is the crux of the Task Force's four year research carried out by a cross-section of distinguished members of the Second
Circuit's bench and bar. The detailed results of statistical data
and focus group research speak for themselves. Few, if any, white
male judges and attorneys believe there is any gender, racial or
ethnicity bias in the circuit. At least twenty five percent of female
judges and much higher percentages of female attorneys report
incidents of gender and racial bias. Even higher percentages of
minority attorneys report incidents of gender and racial bias.
The Task Force notes that as of 1990 there are 26,575 female attorneys in the circuit and that 25,078 are white. Also,
the Task Force notes that as of 1990 there are 76,283 male attorneys in the circuit and 72,507 are white. Thus, as of 1990,
there are at least 8,000 minority (hispanic, black, indigenous,
asian/pacific islander) attorneys in the circuit and at least 27.3
percent of all attorneys in the circuit are women. These census
figures will have dramatically increased by the year 2000. Consequently it is fair to suggest that at least 35 percent of all attorneys in the circuit have perceptions and experiences with
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respect to gender and racial bias which are very different from
white male attorneys. The question, not answered by the Task
Force Report, is what actions, if any, can be pursued to address
these differences.
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